Test the threat.

This one can be a little tricky. You need an associate who is both devious and trustworthy. You want someone to try to defeat your security, but in a friendly way. Immediate and extended family members are often the best candidate pool, friends secondly. Your objective on this front is to test these fronts.

  1. Perceptions. Do the testers see and understand the visual tactics you've employed. For example, if you put a dog bowl and food by a doorway, does the tester see if and realize what the implication is? Does it seem amateurish? For example, if the dog bowl says "spike", or "killer", these names might seem cartoonish or fake. If the dog bowl is empty, or too clean, it may be obvious that it hasn't been used. Put some food in it, scratch it up, lick it, or put something in it that will take on an organic smell suggestive of an active pet. You might consider a chewed doggy bone, or something that shouts "used".
  2. Functionality of tactics. For example, does the alarm really work. Do the motion sensors detect the appropriate level of movement or heat change, does the on-demand illumination shed sufficient luminance to reveal an intruder in the act? If your system has reporting capabilities, do the events get logged and can you access and assess them effectively to identify intrusion efforts? Does any window film designed to obscure inward visibility actual accomplish it's goal or can you see in still? Is a peeper noticeable when pressed against the window? Are there plants or anything else that could be used to permit an observer to conceal himself behind?

The best thing about employing someone else in defeating your efforts is perspective. The more "eyeballs" on a tactical element, the better representation of reality you'll get. What you might well skim over or rationalize, not-you observers will often catch and reveal with ease.